ABSTRACT This paper introduces a new way of thinking that characterizes itself by uniting two entities, namely state estimation in the smart grid (SG) and cognitive dynamic system (CDS). False data injection (FDI) attacks are a family of new attacks that have been considered to be the most dangerous cyber-attack as it leads to cascaded bad decision making throughout the SG network, which can lead to severe repercussions. The conventional state estimation and bad data detection techniques, which have been applied to reduce observation errors and detect bad data in energy system state estimators, cannot detect FDI attacks. Here, we bring into play an objective-seeking system to act as the supervisor of the SG network. To this end, we propose to introduce a new metric for the SG: the entropic state. The entropic state has two purposes: 1) it provides an indication of the grid's health on a cycle-to-cycle basis and 2) it can be used to detect FDI attacks. Consequently, improving the entropic state is the goal of the supervisor. To achieve that objective, the supervisor dynamically optimizes the state estimation process by reconfiguring the weights of the sensors in the network. With optimality in mind, the CDS is the superior choice for the supervisory system. In this structure, the CDS interacts with the SG network, which is considered as the environment. Computer simulations are carried out on a 4-bus and the IEEE 14-bus systems to highlight the performance of the proposed approach in detecting both bad data and FDI attacks in the SG, respectively.
I. INTRODUCTION A. COGNITIVE DYNAMIC SYSTEM
The Cognitive Dynamic System (CDS) is an organized physical model and research tool that simulates certain features of the brain. CDS was first introduced to the engineering world in [1] and then expanded on in [2] . Since its first applications in cognitive radio [3] and cognitive radar [4] , CDS has evolved tremendously over the course of time to give rise to Cognitive Control (CC) [5] and Cognitive Risk Control (CRC) [6] as two of its special functions. While the CRC involves the principle of predictive adaptation, which is new to engineering literature [7] , the main focus of this paper will be targeted towards the integration of CC, considered as the over-arching function of the CDS, with the Smart Grid (SG).
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From a neuroscience point of view, the CDS is based on Fuster's paradigm of cognition involving the following five principles: perception-action cycle (PAC), memory, attention, intelligence, and language [5] . In its purest form, the CDS is made of two main components: the perceptor, on one side, and the executive on the other with the feedback channel bringing them together. From an engineering perspective, CC is well structured to handle a slow progressing cyberphysical system such as the SG. Furthermore the architecture proposed in this paper is the first of its kind whereby a generative model has been incorporated in the perceptor and control performed by viewing the environment indirectly through that same perceptor. A new way to calculate the entropic state, with the SG as the main application, is also introduced. We will show how this entropic state will be fundamental to implement a control-sensing mechanism in the SG to identify and account for bad measurements while also laying the foundation for the detection of False Data Injection (FDI) attacks in the SG.
B. SMART GRID
The current fourth industrial revolution has been marked by the emergence of the Internet of Things (IoTs) and Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) as a portrayal of the new upcoming generation of engineering systems [8] . These have in turn brought significant impacts to almost all aspects of our daily life, such as in electrical power grids, transportation systems, health-care etc. Being deployed in critical infrastructures, CPSs are expected to be safe from vulnerabilities and attacks [9] . Consequently, we can see the growing importance of cybersecurity for these systems. In this paper, we will focus on one such system which is the SG and its greatest current threat known as the FDI attacks (also known as Bad Data Injection (BDI) attacks).
The SG, compared to the traditional power grid, is forecasted to be more powerful in terms of reliability, efficiency and intelligence due to the fact that it will be making use of all the recent breakthroughs in sensing, monitoring, and control strategies [10] , [11] . In [12] , the authors highlight that the SG can be broken down into two main parts namely the power application and the supporting infrastructure. The power application is the part dealing with the fundamental functions of the smart grid, which is electricity generation, transmission and distribution. On the other hand, the supporting infrastructure is the part equipped with intelligence, dealing mainly with the control and monitoring aspect of the fundamental operations of the SG using software, hardware and communication networks.
In the SG, Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition systems (SCADA) monitors and processes mainly the important control actions. SCADA systems collect meter measurements from remote terminal units (RTUs) which consist of different field devices or sensors. The gathered measurements are then transmitted to a control center to be processed and analyzed for errors and inconsistencies. This is done mainly through a process known as state estimation [13] , [14] . In power systems, state estimation is used to estimate the system states using the available measurements at any point in time [15] . In the AC model, state variables are usually the voltage magnitudes and angles at the different buses in the system. The measurements used for state estimation are the real and reactive power flows, power injections and voltage magnitudes and angles from those buses. The current through transmission lines are also taken. Schweppe [13] was the first to introduce the concept of power system state estimation and used the Weighted Least Squares (WLS) method. As the number of measurements is greater than the number of states to be estimated, bad measurements can be discarded whilst still being able to obtain an estimation of the states of the system. Bad measurements are erroneous measurement readings that can hinder the state estimation process. The procedure of identifying those bad measurements is known as bad data identification and is also carried out during the state estimation process. The most commonly used bad data identification (detection) techniques are the Chi-Squared tests and Largest Normalized Residual Test [14] , [16] . These tests rely on the residuals between the estimated state variables and the measurement residuals. State estimators can be classified into DC and AC state estimators. In the DC model, a linear system model is used while in the AC model, a nonlinear model is employed. In the DC model, the measurements comprise of the real power flows and injections and states consist of bus angles [15] , [17] , [18] . The introduction of bad data, which evades the previously mentioned tests, can result in modifying the systems states. Bad data are maliciously crafted offsets to measurements, which are injected to the transmitted sensor readings prior to state estimation to affect the estimated states in a certain way. Consequently, incorrect control decisions may be applied.
C. CONTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATION
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
i) The architectural architecture of the CDS tailored for the SG is presented. To stay as true as possible to the brain, we bring into play a generative model in the perception part of the CDS. This is the first time where we demonstrate the potential of incorporating a generative model in the perceptor for an application such as the SG. ii) A new way to calculate the entropic state is illustrated.
In order to account for the latter and the generative model, a novel algorithm for optimal state estimation, based on CC is presented. The cognitive controller, which resides in the executive, is responsible for picking the right actions that will maximize the available information to the perceptor from one PAC to the next. We show through simulations that it only takes a few cycles for the system to learn which measurements to prioritize and which ones to neglect. The entropic state lays the foundation for a new way of control for the grid for bad data correction and FDI attack detection. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews the basic concepts of state estimation, bad data detection and FDI attacks in the power grid. Section III expands on the structure of the CDS for the SG. We show how the SG can be viewed as the environment with which the CDS interacts. Section IV discusses the simulation results for two cases namely: bad data detection in a 4-bus network, and FDI attack detection in the IEEE 14-bus network. Finally, Section V concludes this paper by highlighting the key results and presenting new avenues for research.
II. PRELIMINARIES A. WEIGHTED LEAST SQUARES STATE ESTIMATION
The real-time operation of the Energy Management System (EMS) is dependent on the measurement data received from the SCADA. In order for the smart-grid to carry out its various tasks, it requires knowledge of the power system VOLUME 7, 2019 states for making decisions in real-time. Since the measurement signals are often corrupted by noise or erroneous, a reliable process is required to filter out the data. In the EMS, the state estimator and bad data detector are responsible for such tasks. Static state estimation refers to the process of obtaining the voltage phasors at all the system buses at discrete time intervals. A set of redundant measurements is taken in order to calculate the optimal state while filtering out the previously mentioned errors. This definition of system state implies only steady state bus voltage phasors most of the time. The states of a power system refer to the bus voltage angle θ and bus voltage magnitudes V. When using the DC model, measurements consist of real power flows and injections and the states are restricted to bus angles only. For this model, the bus magnitudes are assumed to be known beforehand and taken to be close to unity. Moreover, the phase angle at the reference bus is set to zero radians. Consequently, we estimate the n bus voltage angles
T only. In general, the DC power flow model is broadly employed by power engineers and smart grid cyber-security researchers [13] , [19] - [21] as a way to linearize and approximate the Alternative Current (AC) power flow model [8] . The DC approximation has been widely accepted as a substitute for the AC model for the following reasons [22] : i) Faster convergence is guaranteed ii) Reduced algorithmic complexities related to power flow analysis iii) Highly accurate results are obtained when used for transmission system analysis The DC estimation model assumes that the bus voltage magnitudes are already known and are close to or equal to 1.0 per unit. Shunt elements and branch resistances are neglected. The measured real power flow from bus k to m can be approximated by the first order Taylor expansion around θ = 0 with the following formula [11] :
where x km corresponds to the reactance(in per unit values) of the branch k-m, θ k is the phase angle(in radians) at bus k and e is the measurement error. The power injection at a specified bus i can be obtained by adding up all the flows along incident branches to that bus:
In the DC state estimation problem, an overdetermined system of linear equations, which is known as the measurement model, is solved using the Weighted Least-Squares (WLS) problem. The state variables are related to the measurement using the following measurement model:
where • x is the n vector of the true states (unknown)
• z is the m vector of measurements (known)
• H is the m x n Jacobian matrix • Hx is the m vector of linear function linking measurements to states
• e is the m vector of random errors • m is the number of measurements • n is the number of variables In (3), H is a matrix that describes the topology of the power systen. It consists of power flow equations, which are described as vectors in its entries. These can be perceived as the theoritical calculations that relate the states to the measurement vector z. In the AC model, the entries of H consists of a set of non linear functions of the state variables. However, in the DC model, the functions are linear.
In order to solve the weighted least-squares problem for the overdetermined system presented in (3), we need to find the n-vector x that minimizes the index J(x), which is described as follows:
In the above equation, the matrix W is a diagonal matrix which comprises of the measurement weights. These weights may represent qualities such as accuracy of the meter, reliability or an engineering judgement to express how important each individual measurement is to each other. Most of the time, W, is founded on the reciprocals of the measurement error variance σ :
where R z is the covariance matrix of the measurement. We can then differentiate the performance index J(X) to obtain the first order optimal conditions:
where the estimate of the statex is obtained by:
In the above equations, G = H WH is the state estimation gain.
B. BAD DATA DETECTION
When the measurement values contain errors, these should be detected and identified so that it can be removed from the state estimation calculations. The statistical properties of these errors simplify their detection and identification.
The estimated measurements are obtained from the estimated measurements in (7) using the following equation:
The individual estimated measurement error is then obtained using:ê
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These errors follow a Gaussian distribution with zero mean [15] . Many methods for bad data detection exist. The Chi-Squares test and normalized residual are the most common ones. When Chi-squares test is performed, we assume that the states variables are mutually independent from each other and that the errors follow the normal distribution. It is shown in [15] that
follows a χ 2 (m−n) distribution, where m-n is the degree of freedom. The number of degrees of freedom (m-n) is defined as the difference between number of measurements, m, and the number of independent variables, n. The test procedure is performed as follows: i) Calculatex using (7) ii) Using (8) , calulate the corresponding estimated errors through (9) iii) Usef = N m j=1ê
to evaluate the sum of squares.
iv) Using the appropriate number of degrees of freedom k = (N m − N s ) and a specified probability α, find whether or not the value of is less that the critical value corresponding to α. This means that we check if the following inequality has been satisfied:
v) If the above criteria is met, then the state estimates are considered accurate. Otherwise, we can suspect the presence of bad data in the measurement. When that happens, we remove the measurement related to the largest standardized error. The steps are then re-iterated until the conditions are met. When erroneous measurements are present, the sum of squaresf of the estimated errors will be large. In practical power system applications, the number of degrees of freedom is large. Consequently, this allows for the removal of a set of measurements, which relate to the largest standardized residuals. Nevertheless, this does not always mean that the largest standardized errors are always linked to bad measurements. Hence the technique allows for the identification of gross errors. The confidence level α of the Chi-squares test shares similar characteristics to a false alarm probability. The higher α is, the higher its sensitivity to errors. If α is lower, the lower its detection ability to bad data.
C. BAD DATA INJECTION ATTACKS
BDI or FDI refers to those category of cyber-attacks where the attacker injects bad measurements such that they are not detected by the methods mentioned previously. In [23] , the authors call it the stealthy attacks. Various BDI attacks have been identified and their impacts investigated in [9] , [10] , [14] , [16] , [22] - [32] . In [22] , the adversary models for BDI attacks are broken into two main categories namely: i) A model whereby the system parameters and topology (system Jacobian) is known to the attackers. ii) A model where the system configuration is not known to the attackers. 
As a result, state estimation will produce the wrong system state x m×1 instead of the original states x m×1 . The difference in the states of the system will be given as c, where
Liu et al. explains the theory behind this hidden attack and demonstrates his results though experiments. It is shown that if the attack vector satisfies the condition a = Hc, then the residual of the estimation process becomes [22] :
= ||z + a − Hx − Hc|| = ||z − Hx||(since,a = Hc) r normal = r attack (13) As shown in the mathematical proof, the residuals related to the attack vector and the residuals without attack are considered the same. Consequently bad data detection will fail to distinguish the good measurement vector and the one contaminated with the attack due to the fact that it relies on statistical methods to calculate the residuals. As a result, the attack is undetected and will affect the determination of system states, which in turn can cascade into more damaging consequences. In (13) , it inferred that this kind of attack targets state estimation directly in the model of the SG. Thus a can applied either physically by tampering with the targeted meters or wirelessly by injecting the vector when readings are sent to the SCADA. Consequently, any critical component of the SG model involved in state estimation, such as the substation state estimator (SSE) at the substations are not safe from such attacks.
III. ARCHITECTURAL STRUCTURE OF CDS FOR SMART GRID
From a neuroscience point of view, the CDS is the closest system that matches Fuster's paradigm [7] when it comes to cognition. In the overall sense, the CDS consists of four basic components: the perceptor on one side and the executive on the other side; the executive is linked to the perceptor via a feedback channel, and the environment closes a global feedback loop whereby the entire CDS is embraced within it.
In the context of this paper, the DC state estimator, being the recipient of the measurements in the network, is considered as the environment for which the CDS acts as the supervisor. Furthermore, through CC, this new system empowers the state estimator by equipping it with the cognition ability. More specifically, the CDS learns during every PAC which measurements to prioritize for optimal state estimation and which ones to disregard. The complex diagram depicting the unison of CDS and the DC state estimator is shown in Fig. 1 . In the next subsections, the main constituents of the diagram will be elaborated.
A. PERCEPTION-ACTION CYCLE
Assuming that the environment is free of uncertainty, the PAC is responsible for information gain for every cycle. Consequently, the global feedback loop of the PAC successively improves the information extraction ability of the perceptor during the each successive cycles. As a result, a continuous cyclic directed flow of information from the perceptor to the executive is set up. In a goal-focused scenario, a hypothesis, originating from the memory, guides the current PAC for each action performed on the environment by the executive. This hypothesis is then modified at every cycle depending on the information extracted from the perceptor.
B. PERCEPTOR
Both in the human brain, and in the CDS, a perception process is performed on sensory measurements. The role of perception is to extract the available information out of noisy measurements which in response the human performs actions to continually enhance this information in subsequent cycles. These actions are called the cognitive actions. While the perceptor is able to see the environment directly and extract the relevant information about the environment from the observables, the controller senses the environment indirectly via the same perceptor. Unlike the CDS model proposed in [6] , the perceptor for the SG consists of two components namely the generative model and the Bayesian filter, which are reciprocally coupled to each other.
1) GENERATIVE MODEL
Conceptually, the perceptor of the CDS originates with the Bayesian generative model [6] , which classifies the observables from the environment. However, due to the dynamic nature of the SG, the Bayesian generative model is not a suitable choice. As the SG is highly complex in structure, it is crucial to detect any anomalies and deal with them as soon as possible before they can spread over the network and consequently lead to further cascaded problems throughout the system. Inspired by quickest detection theory, the generative model that will be put into action in the perceptor is based on cumulative sum (CUSUM) and is given by:
Where k refers to the current cycle number, L is the window over which the past states is being accumulated, B k is the vector retaining the cumulative sum for each cycle and x i is the vector of the states output from the DC state estimator for the cycle i. While CUSUM-based schemes have mostly been applied for detection only, whereby a suitable threshold has to be chosen as baseline for presence of attacks [33] , [34] , it will be shown later on in this paper how the accumulator in (14) can be used for control as well when employed in the CDS structure. This generative model also has some desirable properties such as being able to smooth out the noise under the slow dynamics of the system.
2) BAYESIAN FILTER
The second component of the perceptor, which is coupled to the generative model, is the Bayesian filter. Since the system is linear in nature and has additive white Gaussian noise, the well-known Kalman filter [35] is opted for the modelling the incoming inputs. The Kalman filter involves the statespace model which consists of a pair of equations known as the Process equation and the Measurement equation namely. Under the assumption that the power system is quasi-static in nature, it is expected that the state variable x at the time k + 1 will be close to its values at its previous cycle k and might be subject only to very small deviations [36] - [38] . Mathematically this can be simplified as:
where ω k is independent Gaussian noise vector with zero mean. Consequently, the measurement equation of the Kalman filter for the perceptor is:
where Y k is the measurement vector of the Kalman filter at cycle k. The covariance matrix of ω k is:
Under the quasi-static postulation, the process equation employed will be a random walk model which is given as:
where v k is the process noise vector which is assumed to be statistically independent and zero mean as well. The covariance matrix of v k is:
With respect to (15) , in (16) and (18) the system matrix L k and the predictive transition matrix F k are assumed to be identity respectively. With the reference to the two previous equations, the computational steps involving the Kalman filter starts with some initial estimates of the states,B k|k , and predicted error covariance, P k|k , which are used for the time update steps as follows:
The predicted estimated states for the next cycle,B k+1|k , is calculated usinĝ
and the predicted error covariance, P k+1|k , is found using
When the next cycle starts, those are then used for the measurement update stages: The Kalman gain, K k , is expressed as
The filtered estimate,B k|k , is formulated aŝ
The process covariance matrix is then updated using
Thus after each time and measurement updated steps, this procedure is repeated with the preceding a posteriori estimates used to predict new a priori estimates.
C. FEEDBACK CHANNEL
The feedback channel [6] plays a distinctive role within the CDS as it links the perceptor to the executive, thus concluding the PAC. For the CDS to act as the supervisor for the SG, the feedback channel is equipped with entropic-information processor, which is responsible for the calculation of the so-called entropic state and internal rewards during reinforcement learning in the executive. The internal rewards calculation will be elaborated in section III-D (Executive) where it is more relevant to the role of the executive during planning. VOLUME 7, 2019
1) ENTROPIC-INFORMATION PROCESSOR
The directed cyclic flow of information from the perceptor to the executive is known as the entropic state of the perceptor. The latter is built on the principles of the perceptual posterior, which can be as viewed as the incoming filtered posterior incorporating the essence of the generative model and the Kalman filter, and entropy, which is derived from Shannon's information theory [39] . According to Shannon's information theory, the entropic state at time k can be formulated as:
where p(B k |Y k ) is the perceptual posterior of the Kalman filter and R denotes the entire space where the state B k lies. Under the assumption that the noise terms in (16) and (18) are Gaussian, the posterior p(B k |Y k ) can be simplified to its mean and covariance matrix at each cycle. Hence the entropic state can be reduced to:
where det{.} is the determinant operator. In [5] , this is further simplified to:
The application of det{.} in (26) and (27) is originally intended to capture the whole information of the matrix into a single number. However, in the case of optimal control and attack detection in mind, (26) and (27) were not suitable to quantize the grid's performance as it was not sensitive enough to react to the actual changes in the environment. Therefore, the following equation is instead used to calculate the entropic state in the entropic information processor:
where diag{.} refers to the diagonal operator. In a general sense, (28) aims to condense the information predicted from the previous cycle k − 1 and information from the current cycle k into a single number. (28) compares the previously predicted filtering-error covariance P k|k−1 with the actual error between the state estimateB k|k−1 and the current measurement at cycle k, Y k . The denominator (28) serves as a normalizing operator where the entropic state, h k|k , is confined to take values between 0 and 1, whereby 1 indicates full control and values below 1 indicate presence of disturbance or uncertainty. Moreover it is to be added that, unlike Shannon's information theory, (26) , (27) and (28) will never assume the value of zero due to the fact that imperfections will always be present in the perceptor in one form or the other. As (28) involves the det{.} operator, the following condition has to be imposed on h k|k :
where d k is the number of negative elements along the diagonal of h k|k during cycle k. Due to the nature of the environment being in the intermediate presence and absence of uncertainties at different times, the entropic state will share completely different properties explained as follows: i) When the environment is in the absence of uncertainty, h k|k , will always be positive because of the probabilistic representation of the uncertainties. ii) Under the presence of uncertainties or cyberattack, h k|k , can become negative. To that end a suitable threshold γ can be chosen for which, when h k|k will be less than γ , this would imply presence of attack. The trace operation can also be instead of using the determinant. In that case, the equation is then
where Tr represents trace. When (30) is used, (29) does not need to be implemented since it involves the sum of the diagonal elements.
D. EXECUTIVE
Conceptually the executive is the most important aspect of the CDS as it is solely responsible for control. To that end, it consists of reinforcement learning and cognitive control, which can be further subdivided into the action space, planner, working memory and policy.
1) REINFORCEMENT LEARNING: BAYES-UCB
While the output of the feedback channel is the entropic state during the PAC, it also produces another output known as the internal rewards during the planning stages involved during Reinforcement Learning (RL) [40] . Before elaborating further, it is to be highlighted that the RL in the CDS relies on the current entropic state. This in turn is used to optimize an objective function for optimal control in the network. In order to explain how every other component of the CDS comes together in the executive, the Bayes-UCB [41] RL algorithm will be briefly covered. Bayes-UCB represents the current state of the art from a class of multi-armed bandit algorithms called UCB algorithms [42] , which are founded on the principle of optimism in the face of uncertainty. In this Bayesian approach to the multi-armed bandit model, the estimate of the reward distribution for each action is updated using the usual Bayesian method. The action to be performed is then selected based on the action which has the highest reward. Thus, the Bayes-UCB algorithm is an index policy that uses the prior distribution to pick a dynamic quantile of the posterior estimates for the index for each action. Therefore, at each time t, Bayes-UCB selects the action A t that satisfies the following condition:
where Q(α, π) refers to the quantile of order α of the distribution π . By assuming that the rewards follow a Bernoulli distribution, and when the prior distribution of each action is Beta(1,1), we can rewrite (31) as [43] :
To keep (32) consistent with the used notations so far, it will be re-written as: (33) where k is the PAC cycle number, S a is the cumulative reward for action a, N a is the number of times action a has been chosen and c is real parameter. From a computational viewpoint, to be consistent with the CDS, the quantile values of the different picked actions that are updated during each PAC share the same consistency as the value function which is described in [6] for the CDS. While the CDS is an entity that aims to mimic the brain as close as possible, it is to be pointed out that Bayes-UCB shares many traits to decision making in humans [44] . Realizing that our architecture comprises of three different models namely, the system configuration H of the power grid, the generative model of the perceptor and the process model in the Kalman filter, the next question that we ask ourselves is how do we bring all three altogether for optimal state estimation with RL? This will be explained in the next section relating to Cognitive Control.
2) COGNITIVE CONTROL
CC is a special part of the CDS as it builds on every other components, described so far, for a goal-oriented action on the system, which is the SG in this instance. In order to do so, CC consists of two important modules namely the planner and the policy. The function of the planner is to extract a set of prospective actions from the action-space A to be evaluated during the planning cycles (i.e., shunt cycles [6] in CDS terminology). This is turn allows the policy to grasp the better actions under the influence of attention from one PAC to the next. Similar to how it is done in the human brain, those shunt cycles involve both the perceptor and the executive to account for all prospective actions within each PAC. In the context of the SG, the action space consists of discrete weight values that can be attributed to the different meters. Consequently, under the influence of attention, the CDS will learn which meters are crucial for optimal state estimation and which are detrimental. Hence, referring back to section II, the important meters will be allocated higher weight values and vice-versa for the faulty ones.
Planning for the cognitive control of the system involves all the three models described previously. The planning starts with a prospective action a i,j k which represents weight value a i for meter j during cycle k. This action is then applied virtually to the weight matrix W in (5) . Using this modified weight matrix, the gain is then re-calculated:
where G p k denotes the planned gain and W i,j k is modified weight matrix where meter j's weight value has been replaced by a i . The new predicted state estimate is then: 
As mentioned previously, this is followed by:
where d p k is the number of negative elements along the diagonal of h k|k during cycle k. Alternatively the trace operation from (30) can also be used instead. In that case trace should replace det throughout the structure. From (37) it is inferred that any uncertainties in the environment, whether it is stochastic or deterministic, will cause the output the generative model to deviate from the hidden state estimated by the Kalman filter. As a result, h p k|k will be closer to the optimal value of 1 when the output state of the DC state estimator is closer to the divergence calculated by the Kalman filter.
3) INTERNAL REWARDS
With equations that define the different steps involved during the shunt cycles, which are reciprocally coupled to the PAC, the stage is now set to describe the calculation of internal rewards for RL. The hypothesized internal reward, r i,j k , associated with each prospective action a i,j k , for cycle k can be written as:
Consequently, the RL algorithm attempts to minimize the disturbance or uncertainty present in the system from cycle to cycle. This can also be viewed from the Kalman filter viewpoint whereby the system is aiming to restrict the amount of uncertainty during the state estimation process within the VOLUME 7, 2019 range of the uncertainty computed by the filter. Hence, it can be seen that the CDS, as defined in this specific architecture, learns from the past and present actions to pick the best actions for the future. This is facilitated through the role of the working memory. The working memory holds temporarily the actions that holds the highest quantile as defined in (32) for the different meters and applies it to the system. During the shunt cycles, as the prospective actions are evaluated and their respective quantiles are updated, if one those actions achieves a higher quantile value than the one for its respective meter in the working memory, then this particular action replaces the previously best action stored in the working memory. From a Bandit perspective, this can be considered as a Contextual Bandit problem whereby each cycle presents new situations to be faced and each action performed on the system brings the system configuration to a new set point that the RL algorithm will have to adapt to and so on.
4) COMPLETE ALGORITHM
With the detailed description of the different components of the CDS for the SG, the stage is now set for an overall definition of the algorithm for the cognitive controller. Algorithm 1 demonstrates the steps involved during each PAC of the system. For convenience, Table 1 shows all the notations mentioned so far with respect to the algorithm. Due to the frequentist approach of the Bayes UCB algorithm and bounded rewards of the Bernoulli reward distribution, some modifications need to be made to keep the algorithm consistent with CC. To that end, in order to update the quantile of the prospective actions, another conditional variable must be used instead of the real cumulative reward. The variable defined as BayesReward is thus used to fullfill this role as shown in lines 34 to 39 where different conditions are specified. In lines 34 and 35, the threshold, f , is used to prevent the the cumulative rewards from becoming overly negatively saturated. Consequently, consider an action which was considered inappropriate most of the time because of the accumulated unbounded negative rewards over time. If a situation arises whereby that said action is now appropriate, it will take a longer time for the Bayes UCB to build up the quantile to default to that action. By introducing f to bound the cumulative negative rewards, it will take a shorter time for its quantile to build up and achieve the highest quantile to be picked for that particular situation. This f grants a comeback opportunity to those actions. In order to provide some initial stability to the cognitive control algorithm when it starts out, the quantiles relating to the default configuration of the weights are initially biased with a value of α. Moreover, the concept of cognitive confidence cycles, n cc , is also introduced. During the n cc cycles, the cognitive controller will learn from the prospective actions and gain a first impression of what the best actions are by calculating their respective quantile values. However those actions are not applied during those cycles. When the n cc cycles are elapsed, the algorithm will start applying those actions to the system using the initial information gained during these n cc cycles. Lastly, the tailoring of this algorithm for the SG allows us to bypass one of the major limitations of RL algorithms as multiple actions relating to the different to meters can applied during each PAC.
There are currently many popular detection methods that have been developped that relies on special meaurements. Among those we will contrast our method with [48] , which is a detection scheme using K-means clustering on CSSVC (Control Signal from the controller to the Static Var Compensator) and NVSI (Node Voltage Stability Index) measurements, and [49] , that involves the use of SVD (Singular Value Decomposition) and convex-optimization in order exploit the low-rank property of the measurement matrix comprising of PMU measurements. Compared to those methods, the technique, proposed in this paper, has higher accuracy and is less prone to false positives since the entropic state will decrease as the attack is continuously propagated throughout the generative model. However, the tradeoff is a slight increase in dectection time. This will be shown in the second part of computational experiments section. The method is also less complex and less computationally intensive as the perceptor operates on an indirect model of the states themselves compared to [48] and [49] , which rely on some special measurements rather than the traditional readings from RTUs on the field. By performing the detection through the workflow described in Fig. 1 , our method is more resistant to the VOLUME 7, 2019 FIGURE 2. Line diagram for 4-bus, 2-generator transmission network case from [15] .
curse of dimensionality which becomes a problem as the size of measurement matrix for K-means clustering or exploiting the low-rank property is scaled up for bigger networks. Lastly, our method also has an adaptive property through the Kalman filter which makes the entropic state dynamic as the system evolves. Thus, this provides higher accuracy at a small cost of increased detection time such as 5 to 15 PAC depending on the intensity of the attack. In the next section of this paper, we will show that the control and FDI attack detection aspects can work independent of each other in two separate experiments. Compared to [48] and [49] , the main parameters of interest for the attack detection criteria are the parameters in the Q matrix of the Kalman filter that dictates its sensitivity to fluctuations or disturbances when applied in the way described in this paper. Consequently it is less complex compared to the two methods referenced. Finally, by iteratively optimizing the weights for state estimation, this adds some nonlinearity to the state estimation process and makes it more sensitive towards non-probabilistic disturbances, such as the FDI attack in the case of this paper. Hence, the method is very robust for cyber-attack detection.
IV. COMPUTATIONAL EXPERIMENTS
In this section, two different experiments were carried out to demonstrate the capability of the architecture which was just described. The first experiment pertains to CC as a Bad Data Detector (BDD) and corrector. In the second experiment, it will be shown how the entropic state can be a metric for cyber-attack detection. In both experiments, the data used to simulate both network configurations comes from the case files in MATPOWER [46] which is an Electric Power System Simulation and Optimization Tools for MATLAB and Octave. In the first experiment, a 4-bus network will be considered. Since this is a small network with a small number of states, this experiment provides a greater insight of how the generative models, states, entropic states, weight values and mean squared errors are evolving through Fig. 3, 4 and 5. While the first experiment is dedicated to the control aspect of the architecture, the second experiment is focused on FDI attack detection in a bigger grid. Since IEEE bus networks have been used as benchmarks for simulations in the other papers referenced in this paper, the IEEE 14-bus network was chosen for the second experiment.
A. COGNITIVE CONTROL FOR BDD
In this first experiment a 4 bus, 2-generator transmission network case from [15] will be simulated as shown in Fig. 2 . The state values relating to the three buses was obtained by solving the power flow equations using MATPOWER [46] for the case data. Using those state values, the seven meter signals were then obtained through the use of (3). Using the mean of those signals, their noisy counterparts were generated with a signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of 20 dB to create z. For the 4 bus, 2-generator transmission network in Fig. 2, the network   FIGURE 3 . Graphs of states, generative models and entropic state. configuration matrix is: 
For the generative model in the perceptor, L was assigned a value of 20. The initial estimates for the Kalman filter is set to 0 for all the three incoming state states from the DC state estimator. The diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix Q were set to 6.25e-04 and the diagonal elements of the R to 0.01. The goal of this experiment is to show the adaptability of this architecture to changing conditions while still carrying out optimal state estimation. To that end, the system is slowly driven to unobservability by changing the SNR of the following meters to 10 dB at the mentioned times: t = 400s for meter 3, t = 700s for meter 1, t = 1000s for meter 7, t = 1300s for meter 2 and t = 1600s for meter 2.
This setup can seen as meter malfunction or a random attack, whereby the attacker has access to limited meters to accomplish his task. The action space consists of a total of 28 actions whereby each meter's weight can set to any of the following values: 1 50 100 150. f was assigned a value of −0.05 and α = 0.2. Lastly 15 planning/shunt cycles are evaluated during every PAC. In the experiment CC is started at t = 200s with 30 cognitive confidence cycles. The results are shown in Fig. 3, 4 and 5. CC is not started immediately at t = 0s as the Kalman filter needs to to settle on the track first for the algorithm to be effective.
As it can be seen in the figures, CC allows the network to be dynamic while choosing the best set of meters simultaneously and assigning the best weights for optimal state estimation. Thus, a direct consequence of using the cognitive controller is that it gains the distinctive capability to learn from the current and past cycles to pick the best possible set of actions for the future. Hence in Fig. 4 , it is shown that when the first meter malfunction occurs at t = 400s, it takes only a couple of PAC cycles to learn from the new situation and decrease the weight attributed to meter 3. Adding to that, VOLUME 7, 2019 the weight values for all the meters are not the same; the cognitive controller adapts to the probabilistic characteristic of the noisy signals. Moreover the algorithm also allows the application of more than one action at each PAC as shown by the simultaneous change of the weight values of the different meters as the disturbance is inflicted to the system. In Fig. 3 , we can evaluate the impacts of the actions taken. At t = 400s, the increase in the amount on noise has the greatest effect on state 3 and state 1 to a lesser extent. However, through the learning process of the cognitive controller, the actions applied to the system restores the states signal to how it was previously before the malfunction occured. Furthermore, because of the dynamic nature of this new architecture, when the meter 1 malfunction occurs at t = 700s, we can see that the same course of action is applied to meter 1 similar to meter 3. Although we can see its weight is lifted again after that, CC is quick to bring it under control. The reason for the earlier increase of the weight of meter 1 can be attributed to the probabilistic origin of the noise coupled with the frequentist approach of the Bayes UCB. Addtionally, prior to this malfunction, the weights of the other meters have also been altered as representation of the cognitive ability of the controller to trust certain meters more than the others. As the other consequent malfunctions are triggered, the appropriate actions are applied to keep the system under control, even during the last case involving unobservability. As a matter of fact, CC learns to pick the best set of meters for state estimation on the go. The state of the grid can also be evaluated using h k|k . h k|k decreases gradually throughout this experiment as more and more disturbances are applied to the grid. Nevertheless, the cognitive controller reacts quickly to this situation by taking the necessary steps to bring the entropic state as close as possible to 1. Fig. 5 shows the mean-squared error (MSE) of the estimated state compared to the real state without noise. It can be seen that the cognitive controller achieves a lower MSE than the conventional state detector without the bad data detector on the overall. Lastly, the Chi-squares test was not implemented in this experiment as the latter is rooted in the statistical properties of the signals while the approach of the architecture presented is based on the principle of cognition rooted in the brain.
Since fluctuations in the voltage angles are very common disturbances in power systems, the experiment gives some insight on how the algorithm differentiates among these. When a disturbance is inflicted on the states, the latter is propagated to the generative model, which consequently affects the determination of the entropic state. As the entropic state is an embodiment of how the grid is performing, it was shown in the experiment that those fluctuations would cause a decrease in the entropic state. However, the goal of the algorithm is to always optimize the entropic state towards a value of 1. By optimizing h k|k , CC is trying to minimize the amount of fluctuations in the system and maintain the evolution of the states in a controlled manner. Referring back to Fig. 3 , it can be seen that when the meter malfunctions occurred, this in turn caused larger deviations in some of the states. At the same time, it can be seen that there was a dip in h k|k . However, CC is able to quickly raise h k|k and bring state estimation under control. The last part of Fig. 5 shows that the algorithm is able to keep the amount of fluctuations under control even in a case where the system would be considered unobservable.
B. CYBER-ATTACK DETECTION
In this section, the dual property of the entropic state for FDI cyber-attack detection will be demonstrated. Previously, it was shown how the latter is an objective function for the normal running of CC under the absence of uncertainty whereby it is always positive. However, when the presense of uncertainties are no longer probabilistic, such as when an attack takes place, the entropic state will also enable early detection of such attacks. Although many specialized attacks such as replay attack or Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack exist, four broad categories of FDI attacks will be considered as follows: i) Case 1: Here we assume that the intruder has perfect knowledge of the network configuration H and full access to meters to commit the perfect FDI attack as mentioned in section II. The remaining cases consider more realistic scenarios whereby the hacker faces some constrictions. ii) Case 2: In this scenario, the intruder still has full knowledge of H but has limited access to meters in the grid. To simulate this attack, some of the rows of the attack vector a are zeroed to represent the inability to access those sensors. iii) Case 3: Here the circumstances of case 2 are flipped around; the intruder has access to all the meters but incomplete knowledge of H. To carry out the attack, some of the rows of H are zeroed as an indication of the lack of information. iv) Case 4: Finally, a rogue attack combining case 2 and 3 is considered. The attacker has both imperfect knowledge of H and constrained access to the sensors in the grid. In order to simulate this attack, some rows of a and H are zeroed out to represent the attacker's limitations. The mentioned attacks in those different situations will be simulated on the IEEE 14 bus network as shown in Fig. 6 . In all of the mentioned cases, the hacker's goal is to deflect the value of one the states by a value of 0.15 radians. Since attack data is not publicly available, the parameters in the MATPOWER package will be used to simulate the IEEE 14 bus network.
In all four attack cases, the attack is started at t = 500s. The same conditions were used as in the precedent 4 bus case except for the following: the diagonal elements of the diagonal matrix Q was set to 4.9e-03, γ = 0.25 and the trace operation will be applied instead of det as it leads to higher values of h k which is better for the sake of illustrability. Additionally, the property of h k will demonstrated as a stand-alone utility in the absence of CC. While CC is originally defined for tackling control when the uncertainties are probabilistic and h k is positive, the CDS has to expand its structure its to include CRC to be able to bring risk under the control in the presence of the cyber-attacks. The discussion relating to the implementation of the CRC to this architecture will be left for another day. The results pertaining to the simulation of the attacks presented earlier are shown in Fig.7, 8, 9 and 10. In all four cases, by assigning a suitable γ , the attack was detected. Furthermore, it can also be seen that as the hacker has less and less information on the current grid, it becomes easier to detect the deflection as the entropic state becomes more negative. The results also displays the efficiency of the generative model, whereby the attack propagates thoughout the cumulative sum upto a certain point before the Kalman filter gets back on the current track. This propagation causes h k to become increasingly negative which consequently lends the property of detection.
All the computational experiments were carried out on a system running Windows 10 with an Intel i7-8750H processor. The computational running time of the first experiment was 1.8s and the second experiment took around 0.13s for each of the cases mentioned. From the experiments, it was found that the use of trace for the calculations was faster than the one involving the determinant of the matrix. If the CDS architecture proposed in this paper is applied in a medium or large-scale power system, the computational complexity will be lesser compared to the other current detection methods, such as the ones mentioned earlier. Moreover, the application of the CDS for an application such as the SG is revolutionary as it is a dual system catering to both the control and attack detection aspects of the SG. The main parameter of interest that needs to be scaled up for a more complex grid will be the number of shunt cycles since more meters will have to be evaluated. Nevertheless, it recommended to keep the action space small so as to make planned rewards, during planning, distinguishable from each other. Another important hyperparameter in the system, especially for FDI attack detection, are the values in the Q matrix. In the first experiment, the diagonal elements of matrix Q was set as 6.25e-4 while in the second experiment, the values were set to 4.9e-3. The choice of using determinant or the trace operation for the calculations involved in the CDS is very important when choosing Q. Furthermore, unlike many tracking applications such as the simulation carried out in [5] , which was supported by a mathematical formulation [50] , this is not the case in our system. Thus, the contents of Q has be defined by the designer depending on the required sensitivity of the system towards disturbances. In order to find proper values for Q, prior simulations can be carried out using past historical data. Usually, it is recommended to start with very small values, like the ones used in the simulations carried out in this paper, and then tuning until the desired performance is obtained. Lastly, as the SG is scaled up, that hyper-parameter will have to be increased to reflect the circumstances of a bigger power system.
In the second experiment involving the four attack cases, the detection time was around 5-10 PAC. However, depending on the intensity of the attack, this detection time can be as small as 5-10 PAC and can go up to 10-15 PAC for slowly evolving attacks such as a ramp attack. Thus, the PAC will depend on the sampling time of the DC state estimator; if the states are being calculated every 5s, then it can take 25s to 50s to detect the attack. While this may slightly long, it is a small cost to pay for higher detection accuracy. As mentioned previously, this time can be cut down either by tuning the Q values or by increasing the frequency at which the state is sampled. The threshold for attack detection can also be increased.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper is innovative on the following three accounts:
i) This is the first time where we were able the bring the CDS, which is rooted in the brain, and the SG together for a new architecture that is able to handle the new problems that will be facing the grid in the coming years as everything becomes more and more interconnected. ii) The cognitive control algorithm presented is novel in the sense that multiple actions can be applied to the system during each PAC while maintaining stability. Moreover, learning in the RL algorithm is carried out immediately in a Bayesian fashion utilizing information from the current cycle and the successive past cycles. The CDS which was described in the earlier papers referenced was targeted towards simpler systems whereby learning was assessed only once and was limited to one performed action during every PAC. The computational experiments and results in this paper show that this new algorithm, specific towards the SG, can overcome the previous limitations. iii) The architecture serves the dual purpose of a new kind control, which is based on cognition, and cyber-attack detection. Just like Q represents the process uncertainty in the Kalman filter equations, the RL algorithm in this architecture also inherits this property. More specifically, the RL algorithm regulates the amount of the uncertainty in the system dynamically from cycle to cycle. In a real SG network involving thousands of meters, the inverse operation during state estimation and planning can be costly. To that end, a function approximator such as a neural network [47] can be used to accelerate the computation. On the other hand, the use of a RL algorithm such as the Bayes UCB presented this paper, which is based on a frequentist approach, will increase the amount of time for the cognitive controller to learn the best configuration as the network is scaled up and malfunctions occur. As a solution, the RL algorithm can be tweaked to make it more sensitive to changes to decrease its response time. Additonally, although this was touched lightly in the paper, the number of planning (shunt) cycles is very important for the learning process. However, the number of those cycles should neither be too small nor too big to prevent confusion in the cognitive controller as there might be more than one optimal configuration of a huge grid. Lastly, the focus of this paper was to give an insight of this architecture from a control point of view. Nevertheless, once a cyber-attack is detected, the CDS has to expand its structure to include CRC to handle control in such situations. This discussion will be left for another day. Since the DC estimation model was considered in this paper, future research in this topic can be oriented towards the application of this architecture in the AC estimation model, which involves the reactive components. Since the AC state estimation procedure is a recursive procedure that is different from the DC model, a new process that embodies the AC state estimator and the perceptor will have to be formulated to make the process more computer efficient. Additionally, as mentioned in the introduction, the architecture of the CDS in Fig. 1 , tailored for the SG, has also been previously applied in other areas such as cognitive radar and cognitive radio. Nevertheless, the architecture proposed can also be extended to other applications subjected to disturbances and/or uncertainties, such as Vehicular Radar Systems where optimal state estimation and tracking are very important. However, for these different applications, the mathematical formulations of the perceptor and the executive will have to be tailored accordingly depending on the end goal of the system.
